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STOTT v. FAIRLAMB,
Where a debtor at the time when be is entitled to make an immediate payment
of an antecedent debt gives for the amount of the debt a promissory note payable
on demand, which is intended to be a promissory note and is accepted by the
creditor, the note is a "paynpent conditional on its being met, and isounded on
valuable consideration.
By a deed the defendant agreed to pay to S. the sum of 20001. within three years
of the date of the deed. Subsequently a promissory note payable on demand was
given for the 20001. by the defendant to S.
Held on appeal, that there was valuable consideration for the promissory note.

of the plaintiff from the judgment of DENmAN, J.
The action was brought by the plaintiff as executrix of one Stott
on a promissory note, dated July 31st, 1881, whereby the defendant
*promisd to pay Stott, or order, on demand, 20001., with interest at
51. per cent.
It was proved -at the trial that on the dissolution of a partnership
*which had existed between Stott and the defendant, a written
agreement, dated August 8th, 1881, was entered into between the
partners in pursuance of a previous arrangement come to on July
31st, 1881.
By the agreement, which recited that a sum of 20001. was due
to Stott, it was agreed (inter alia) that the defendant should pay to
Stott 20001. within three years of the date thereof, with interest at
5. per cent. on the same, or the instalments thereof for the time
being remaining unpaid, to be computed from July 31st, 1881,
Stott to accept the 20001. in full satisfaction of all his share in the
stock, &c., of the partnership.
Evidence was admitted at the trial, subject to objection, that
after the agreement was signed Stott called upon the defendant and
told her that he wanted something to sb~w to his own people; that
they were not satisfied with the agreement, and wanted a promissory
note; and, also,- that Stott verbally promised to send a letter to the
defendant to the effect that the note was'not to be enforced until
the expiration of the three years mentioned in the agreement.
The note in question was then given, and dated back to July 31st,
1881.
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The jury found that the note was given subject to the conditions
contained in the agreement of August 8th.
On further consideration, DENMAN, J., was of opinion that the
above evidence was not admissible to contradict the terms of the
note, though it was admissible to prove that there was no consideration for the note as between the immediate parties. His
lordship held that there was no consideration for the note, and
entered judgment for the defendan;.
The plaintiff appealed.
A. Wills, Q. 0., and Cyril -Dodd,for the plaintiff.
Waddy, Q. C., and Wilberforce, for the defendant.
M. .- In this case I am of opinion that the evidence
shows that the promissory note was given as a promissory note, and
not as an escrow. The case has been argued on two views of the
first agreement. It was said that the agreement was to be taken
to be one which, the moment it was executed, made a debt of 20001.
which was then existing, but was payable at a future time in the
sense that it was to be only paid on a future fixed day. Therefore, on that view the question was whether, where there is a debt
existing in prcesenti, but naturally payable in futuro on a fixed
day, a promissory note payable on demand, and given in respect
of that liability, is founded on sufficient valuable consideration.
On the other side, it was said that that is not the present case,
which is, that the debt was existing in prcesenti,but was to be paid
at any time within a certain period, so that the debtor would have
a power, at any time within that period, of relieving himself from
the interest which was due until the debt was paid. It was said
that, that being the effect of the agreement, the debtor was entitled
to pay at any time within the three years, and that, when he gave
the promissory note payable on demand, and the creditor accepted
it, he had exercised the right given under the contract. Of course,
such a payment would be conditional, and, if the note was not
paid on demand, the right under the deed would revive. It was
argued that neither view is within the authority of Misa v. Currie,
1 App. Cas. 554, and we must so hold if we are to decide for the
defendant.
Suppose there is a debt existing in prmsenti, but payable in
futuro on a fixed day, whether the existence of that relation
BRETT,
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between the parties will afford sufficient consideration for a
promissory note which is payable on demand, and is intended to be.
a promissory note, and to have the ordinary effect of such, is a
matter which is, at least, very doubtful in favor of the plaintiff. It
is not necessary to decide that point, and we have not come to a
conclusion upon it in this case. But, assuming that there would
not be sufficient consideration in those circumstances, and that the
case would not be within Misa v. Currie, we turn to the second
view, which is that within which this case lies. The question is,
whether the principle -of Misa v. Currie applies in a case where
there is a debt existing in prcesenti which the debtor is entitled not
to pay until a future fixed time, but is equally entitled to pay, and
there are reasons why he might so do, at any time within that
period, and a promissory note for the amount, payable on demand,
is given at a time when the debtbr has a right to pay, and to
relieve himself from liability. The answer depends upon what we
think to be the true principle of that decision. It is true that in
that case there was an existing debt payable, and which might have

been enforced at the moment when the note was given, so that
there was an existing debt payable in prasenti. Therefore, the
facts of that case do not decide this one. But we think that a
principle is there laid down, that, where there is a state of things
which entitles a person to make a payment, the giving in respect
of that right a promissory note, which is intended to be a promissory
note, is a payment conditional on the note being met,.and there is
a sufficient consideration to support the promise in the note, and to
enable an action to be brought upon it. I think we ought, on a
consideration of Misa v. Currie, to alter the proposition of the
plaintiff, and to say that, where there is a state of things which
entitles a debtor to pay at once, and he gives a promissory note
payable on demand, the result in law is that that is a conditional
payment, and there is sufficient consideration for the note which
can legally be sued upon. It was suggested that we must come to
that conclusion upon the interpretation of the Bills of Exchange
Act, 1882; but this is a note given before the passing of that Act,
the construction of which does not now arise for decision. Therefore, in t difficult case in which'the decision is somewhat nice, and
must not be taken to go further than is necessary in the case, we
must differ from the Divisional Court, and the appeal must fail.
BAGGALLAY,

L. J.-The conclusion at which I have arrived-
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viz., that there was sufficient consideration for this note--depends
upon the special circumstances of the case, and mainly on the fact
that the obligation imposed by the deed of dissolution was not to
•pay the 20001. with interest at the expiration of the three years,
but at any time within that period. It was open to the defendant
to have paid the amount and thus to have relieved herself from
liability, and she also had a right to make such a conditional payment as she did make by giving the note in question, provided the
creditor was willing to accept it. It appears to me that the case
comes within the principle, though not within the facts of Misa v.
Currie, that a debt payable at the time when a note payable on
demand is given in respect of it is a sufficient consideration for the
note.
4
BOWEN, L. J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that under
the agreement the defendant had a right to pay at any time within
three years, and that it was not certain that it might not become
her interest to do so. Therefore, there existing a deed which
specified the time for paym'ent, subject to an option of paying
earlier, the parties interested were not satisfied, and the plaintiff
called upon the defendant and the note was then given. It seems
to me to be clear that the note was intended to have some effect,
and I think, a legal effect, and to be a note enforceable according
to its tenor on demand; otherwise the object of the plaintiff would
have been defeated and the interview useless. I think that the
principle of the decision in Misa v. Currie applies to show that a
note given in such circumstances is not without consideration.
Here the debtor had a right to pay at once, and in lieu of cash he
gives the creditor a promissory note payable on demand, intending
it to have the effect of such a note. The note being intended to be
an effectual and valid note, and being given by a person who had a
right to pay at that time, was a conditional payment falling exactly
within the principle of. 111isa v. Currie. As to the agreement
alleged to have been made at the time the note was made, we cannot inquire into it in order to vary the legal iffect of the note,
though we can do so for the purpose of seeing whether there was
any consideration for the note.
Appeal allowed.
The precise question involved in the
principal case is, whether if a debtor

gives a pre-existing creditor his promissory note on demand for the exact amount
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of the debt, but before the same is absolutely payable, such note is wholly without consideration and void. We doubt
whether any case exists in America
where such a defence has been set up.
The implied discharge and extinguishment of the original cause of action, or
the' forbearance to sue the same naturally implied from the acceptance of the
new security, seems to furnish abundant
consideration for the new promise. See
McClees v. Burt, 5 Mfet. 198. Daniel on Neg. Inst. vol. 1, p, 184, says,
"There is no doubt that a pre-existing
debt of the maker is a valid consideration for his executing a note, and, indeed,
is as frequently the- consideration of
negotiable paper as a debt contracted at
the time." That the satisfaction or discharge of the original obligation is the
real consideration of the note, necessary
to its validity, see Warren v. Durfee,
126 Mass. 338.
The more serious question is as to the
effect of an indorsement of some third
person's promissory note to a pre-existing creditor of the indorser. Is that an
indorsement "forvalue" so as to shut
out (all other proper conditions existing),
any equitable defence the maker might
have against the payee. The established
rule in America is that if such indorsement is taken in "actual payment" of
such pre-existing debt, it is taken for
value, and the equities are excluded.
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, decided in
1842, ia certainly the leading case on the
subject. See also Blanchardv. Stevens,
3 Cash. 162, which has been uniformly
followed in Massachusetts. See Woodruff v. Mill, 116 Mass. 310. And the
same rule prevails elsewhere.

Holmes

v. Snm.th, 16 Me. 177 ; Norton v. Waite,
20 Me. 175; Williams v. Little, 11 N.
H. 66; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn.
388; Carlisle v. Wishart, 11 Ohio 173.
Even the New York courts have given
such effect to the transfer where the
proof was clear that it was given and
received in full payment and complete

discharge or extinguishment of the indorser's prior indebtedness, so as to leave
no remedy thereon, whether the note so
indorsed should or should not be paid by
the maker. Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, 23 Wend. 311 ; White v.,Springfield Bank, 3 Sandf. 222; Bank of
Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115;
Gould v. Segee, 5 Duer 260. Although they deny such a result, where
such actual proof is wanting, or where
clearly the note was taken as "conditional payment," so called; that is,
payment, if such note be paid, otherwise not, and thus leaving the original
cause of action still in existence; not
apparently giving the same prima fade
presumption of payment to such a transfer as some other tribunals do. See
Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637;
Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286; Turner v. Treadway, 53 Id. 650 ; Small
v. Smith, 1 Denio 583; Comstock v.
Bier, 73 N. Y. 274.
What the rule is when the note is indorsed merely as "collateral security"
for a prior indebtedness, is not well
agreed. Many courts hold that the same
result follows, as if the transfer was
taken in actual payment, and consequently that the equities between maker
and payee are completely shut out.
Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt. 569 ; Bank
oJ the Republic v. Carrington, 5 R. I.
515; Cobb v. Doyle, 7 Id. 550;
Bridgeport City Bank v. Welch, 29 Conn.
475; Osgood v. Thompson Bank, 30
Id. 27 ; Roberts v. Hall, 37 Id. 211.
On the other hand it is often held that
the indorsee in such latter case does not
take the note free from equities, unless
he parts with some new consideration,
such as making some new advances, extending the time of payment of his preexisting debt, giving up some other
collateral security he held for it, suspending or foregoing some power or rights
to secure the same in some way. And
much may be logically said for that view,
as was very well stated by Chancellor

